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Abstract. The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's
and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely aect the interpretation of
data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs
(between-subjects and within-subjects) used to conduct experiments may fail to suciently
account for this concern. An alternative design for laboratory experiments is proposed which
may alleviate this concern especially in studies of social preferences. The proposed design is
used to answer some questions that have attracted continued attention in the literature on
social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0901. Introduction
One of the main reasons economists use laboratory experiments to answer questions of inter-
est is that the experimenter can potentially exercise better control over some of the factors
that aect the decisions of subjects. At the same time, experimenters are confronted with the
possibility that the behavior of subjects is in
uenced by various contextual features which
are often dicult to control in the lab. The analysis of data from a laboratory experiment
not only involves documenting the responses of subjects but also providing an interpretation
of the behavioral patterns. Orne (1962, 1973) highlighted that the behavior of subjects is a
response to their perception of the experiment which may dier from what the experimenter
believes it to be. As noted by Samuelson (2005, pp. 94, 96),
\::: interpretation of experimental results can then depend importantly on how we imagine
subjects perceive the game ::: Despite an experimenter's best eorts to ensure that subjects
understand what they are dealing with, ::: it is not clear when we can be condent that the
subjects' models match the experimenter's."
An important component of the requirement that a subject's model of a situation matches
the experimenter's model is that the subject and the experimenter should attach the same
meanings to the elements in the action sets of the agents involved in an interaction. A mis-
match between the meanings attached by subjects and the experimenter to the various actions
may adversely aect the interpretation of data, particularly in studies of social preferences.
For example, Eckel and Wilson (2004) report that subjects within and across the roles of
trustors and trustees dier in their perception of the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut, and Mc-
Cabe, 1995).2 If trustees construe the situation as that of receiving a short term loan from a
friend, then they would not be inclined to return more than what was loaned to them by the
trustors. Consequently, it may not be appropriate to interpret such a behavioral pattern as
evidence for the lack of `extra' returns to trust.
The question that motivates the present paper is: How to increase the likelihood that
subjects attach the same meanings to actions as does the experimenter in any given lab
experiment? Numerous researchers have alluded to the importance of coming up with ex-
perimental designs that can reduce the likelihood of such a mismatch and thereby aid in
valid interpretation of lab data. Some of the prominent contributions include the work of
Tversky and Kahnemann (1981) in the domain of individual choice, Dyer and Kagel (1996)
in common-value auctions, Homan et al. (1996) in dictator games, and Levitt et al. (2010)
in zero sum games. Ortmann and Gigerenzer (1997), Smith (2003, 2010), Camerer (2003),
Samuelson (2005), Harrison and List (2004), Levitt and List (2007), Bardsley et al. (2010),
and Bolton (2010) are excellent sources for a general discussion of this issue.3
2In the standard trust game the rst mover (often referred to as the trustor) decides how much of his
endowment to pass to the second mover. This amount is multiplied by a factor m > 1 by the experimenter,
and the second mover (the trustee) then decides how much of this amount to return to the rst mover. This
game is believed to involve trust on part of the rst mover as an own-payo maximizing second mover would
not return any amount and thus the rst mover will be worse o by transferring any amount in the rst place.
3The interested reader may also refer to a recent issue (Volume 73(1), 2010) of the Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization.
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motivation by comparing the dierences in behavior of subjects across two games. For in-
stance, suppose a researcher hypothesizes that (i) the amount transferred by a dictator to the
recipient in a dictator game4 re
ects her altruistic preferences and (ii) the amount transferred
back by a trustee to the trustor in a trust game re
ects the combined in
uence of altruistic
and reciprocal preferences. Further suppose the main hypothesis of the researcher is that
trustees will give more than dictators and this dierence should be interpreted as evidence of
a preference for reciprocity (Bolton et al., 1998 and Cox, 2004).
The mode of implementing the experiment is often decided after identifying the treatments
that would allow for a test of the relevant hypotheses. At this stage, the experimenter has
to make three decisions: which games subjects are informed about, which games they are
allowed to play, and the timing of information and play.
The manner in which the games are implemented, along with the games themselves,
determines the inferences one may draw from the data. One way to implement the above
mentioned experiment would be to use a between-subjects design whereby one set of subjects
would play the trust game and a dierent set of subjects would play the dictator game (and
subjects who play one game will have no information about the other game). We shall argue
that the between-subjects design may fail to suciently account for the concern regarding the
interpretation of data in such experiments as there could be a signicant mismatch between
the experimenter's and subjects' models of an abstract game presented in isolation.
The motivation for using the within-subjects design, the leading alternative to the between-
subjects design, comes from asking: What are the possible sources of dierences in behavior
across the two games in a between-subjects implementation? It prioritizes reducing dier-
ences in behavior across two games that could arise in the between-subjects implementation
because of dierent subjects playing the two dierent games. Therefore, subjects are asked
to play both the games in a sequential manner. However, this feature introduces some other
concerns which have been acknowledged in the literature (Cox, 2010).
The motivation for the design proposed in the present paper comes from asking: What
are the channels through which heterogeneities across individuals could lead to dierences in
behavior in the same game? Dierences in preferences, dierences in beliefs about others, and
dierent perceptions of the same game are three obvious possibilities. The proposed design
prioritizes reducing the dierences in perception of the same game that could arise in the
between-subjects implementation because of the abstract nature of the game. This design
will be referred to as the hybrid design since it combines some features of between and within
subjects designs. It involves
 providing information about both the games (the experimenter plans to compare in
order to test the relevant hypotheses) to all subjects; but,
 randomly assigning some subjects to play one of the two games and the remaining
subjects to play the other game.5
4In the basic version of the dictator game one subject is endowed by the experimenter with a certain amount
of money and asked to share it with another subject (the recipient) who has no choice to make.
5Orne (1962, 1973) and Kahnemann (2003) hint towards such a design. However, no explicit discussion, or
use, of such a design exists in the literature to the best of our knowledge.
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Figure 1: Trust and Dictator Games
The within-subjects design allows the experimenter to test whether the behavior in the
second game is sensitive to having played the rst game by conducting two dierent exper-
imental sessions where (dierent) subjects play the two games in the two possible orders.
Similarly, whether the behavior of subjects in one game is in
uenced by the information
about the other game in a hybrid implementation can be easily tested.
Each mode of implementation accompanies certain tradeos. Section 2 provides a detailed
discussion of these tradeos using the games illustrated in Figure 1. We choose these two
games { modied versions of the trust and dictator games { as they are among the most
widely studied games and help us clarify the tradeos associated with the three designs in a
transparent manner. In the second part of the paper the choices and beliefs of subjects par-
ticipating in a hybrid implementation of these games are analyzed to assess whether subjects
perceive these games in the manner an experimenter would and to examine whether the data
provide any evidence of reciprocal actions.
2. Tradeos in Experimental Designs
Consider the games T and D shown in Figure 1. In game T, subject A (the trustor) may
choose IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, then both subjects in the pair get a payo of ve. If
A chooses IN, then B (the trustee) decides the amount xB to give to A out of twenty. The
game T possesses all the features of a trust game as (i) the choice of IN by the trustor leads
to eciency gains but (ii) an own-payo maximizing trustee would not transfer any amount
to the trustor if the trustor chooses IN.
The game D is essentially a dictator game presented in a slightly modied manner.
Subject C (the recipient) has no freedom of choice as she must choose IN. Only subject D
(the dictator) has an eective choice in this game and has to decide the amount xD to give
to subject C out of twenty. The games T and D may also be thought of as voluntary and
4
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faced by a trustee in game T is identical to the action set faced by a dictator in game D.
The experimenter designs the two games such that the only dierence between them is
whether the rst mover has a choice or not. Given the salience of this dierence, she may
nd it reasonable to interpret (i) the voluntary choice of IN by a trustor as truly a move that
involves trust, (ii) the choice faced by a trustee as involving reciprocation, and to be condent
that (iii) the choice faced by a dictator diers from the choice faced by a trustee because it
lacks any element of reciprocation.
The question regarding which mode of implementation should be used to test whether
there is any evidence of reciprocal actions/preferences arises after the experimenter has settled
on the appropriate treatments. We now discuss the tradeos involved in a between-subjects,
within-subjects, and hybrid implementation of games T and D.
2.1. Between-subjects design
A between-subjects implementation of the games T and D illustrated in Figure 1 would
involve one set of subjects playing the game T without any information about the game D
and a dierent set of subjects playing D without any information about T.6
Let XB and XD denote the vectors of amounts given by trustees to trustors and by
dictators to recipients, respectively. One may dene transfers by dictators as a measure of
their altruistic preferences. Similarly, one may dene transfers by trustees as re
ecting the
combined in
uence of their altruistic and reciprocal motivations. Then, any observed positive
dierence between the transfers by trustees and dictators will, by denition, capture positive
reciprocity. But, can we unambiguously interpret the observed dierence between XB and
XD as evidence of positive reciprocity.
Cherry et al. (2002), Dana et al. (2005), List (2007), and Bardsley (2008) provide com-
pelling evidence that interpreting the transfers by dictators as evidence of context-independent
altruistic preferences may not be appropriate. Eckel and Wilson (2004) would caution against
interpreting the behavior of trustees as involving reciprocation unless we are condent that
subjects indeed view the game T as involving trust and reciprocity. If it is dicult to in-
terpret the meaning of XD and XB, then interpreting the dierence between XB and XD as
evidence of reciprocal preferences seems suspect.
It may be helpful to ask what makes the researcher condent regarding the plausibility
of the hypothesis that the dierence in the behavior of trustees and dictators can be inter-
preted as evidence of positive reciprocity. The answer lies in recognizing that the researcher
compares the two games while formulating the hypothesis. Thinking about both the games si-
multaneously provides the researcher the appropriate context to attach a largely unambiguous
meaning to the elements in the action sets of the agents playing the games.7
6The between-subjects design essentially mimics the experimental procedure used in physical sciences where
the aim is to document dierences in responses to dierent stimuli. The main dierence between experiments
in physical sciences and economics is that the experimenter tries to ensure that subjects in an economic
experiment understand the task they have been presented.
7Birnbaum (1999) shows that it may be unreasonable to assume that the context is the same across the
dierent sets of subjects participating in the between subjects implementation.
5
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 090Subjects playing the trust game are not informed about the dictator game, and vice-versa,
when one uses a between-subjects design whereby each game is played out in dierent exper-
imental sessions by dierent sets of subjects. There is, therefore, an asymmetry between the
context in which the researcher formulates the hypothesis and the context in which subjects
participating in a between-subjects implementation make their choices.
This asymmetry will not create any problems if subjects attach the same meanings to
the various actions available to the subjects in dierent roles in the trust/dictator game pre-
sented to them in isolation. The very process of understanding the rules of one abstract
game might (consciously or unconsciously) lead subjects to form analogies between the task
they have been presented with and situations they have encountered outside the laboratory
(Smith, 2003). Thus, in the between-subjects implementation, it becomes dicult to dismiss
the methodological concern which has been raised by numerous researchers and summarized
by Harrison and List (2004, pp. 1050) as follows.
::: experimenters should be wary of the conventional wisdom that abstract, imposed treat-
ments allow general inferences. In an attempt to ensure generality and control by gutting all
instructions and procedures of eld referents, the traditional lab experimenter has arguably
lost control to the extent that subjects seek to provide their own eld referents.
Moreover, when subjects seek to provide their own eld referents dierent subjects may
construct dierent models of the same situation which may severely limit our ability to provide
a coherent interpretation of the behavior of subjects. This critique questions the interpretabil-
ity of data obtained via lab experiments. However, it may be worth noting that it does not
regard abstract experimental treatments and the lack of eld referents as the fundamental
problem. A constructive reading of this critique essentially points out the importance of
designs for lab experiments which ensure better task perception by subjects and reduce the
need for subjects to rely on personal eld referents and thereby decrease the likelihood of a
mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of the interaction.
Framing the experimental task using a particular context can reduce this mismatch in var-
ious cases but it comes at the cost of reduced generality of results (Ortmann and Gigerenzer,
1997). We shall argue that the hybrid design can potentially reduce the mismatch without
compromising much with generality.
2.2. Within-subjects design
The standard within-subjects implementation of the games illustrated in Figure 1 would
involve subjects receiving instructions about one of the two games (say, T), playing that
game, receiving the instructions for the second game, and then playing the second game.
Those who play as trustees (trustors) in T would play as dictators (recipients) in D. When
subjects would be provided the detailed instructions for the rst game they would be informed
that they will have to play another game which will be described in detail after the rst game
has been played. Subjects would be paid for only one of the two games to reduce income
eects and to increase the likelihood that they treat each game as a separate game.
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design, is to control for individual heterogeneities. In addition, it gathers more data per
subject. The appeal of within-subjects implementation for any given experiment ultimately
depends upon how the experimenter subjectively resolves the tradeo between these two
major benets and the concerns discussed below.
The informational environment faced by subjects while making their decisions in the rst
game in the within-subjects implementation diers in a crucial way from that faced by subjects
in a between-subjects implementation. The mere fact that subjects know that they will be
playing another game may in
uence their behavior (Smith, 2010). It may adversely aect
the interpretability of data by creating a mismatch between the experimenter's and subjects'
models of the situation.
Subjects are usually paid for only one of the several games they play during a within-
subjects implementation to ensure that subjects treat each game as a separate game. However,
it is dicult to verify that subjects do treat each game as a separate game.8 Cox (2010)
provides a detailed discussion of the payment mechanism used in within-subjects designs by
explaining its theoretical underpinnings and highlighting the associated concerns.
While using a within-subjects implementation one usually tests for order eects: whether
or not the behavior of subjects in either game is sensitive to having played the other game.
If there is evidence of order eects, then the experimenter may have to abandon the data
and carry out the experiment using a between-subjects design (Bohnet et al., 2008). It is not
clear what inference can be drawn in such a scenario.
The discussion of the between-subjects design in the previous section suggests that sub-
jects may better understand the meanings of actions available in the two games only after
they are informed about the second game during a within-subjects implementation. This
could be one of the reasons for order eects.
2.3. Hybrid design
A hybrid implementation of the games T and D illustrated in Figure 1 would be as follows.
All subjects in a given session would be informed about both the games. Subjects would then
be randomly assigned to one of the four player-roles. A subject would get paid only for the
game she actually plays. It will be useful for the following discussion to take note of a variant
of the hybrid design wherein subjects would be informed about both the games but only one
of the two games would be selected for actual play during an experimental session.
The main dierence between the hybrid design and its variant on the one hand, and
the existing designs on the other, pertains to the information subjects have while making
decisions. This is obviously the case in comparison with a between-subjects implementation.
Even if subjects in a within subjects implementation were to be informed about all their tasks
at the very beginning, it would still not be similar to the hybrid design because each subject
would participate in only one game in the hybrid implementation.
8Blanco et al. (Forthcoming) point towards this possibility as one of the likely reasons behind the nding
that the theory of inequity-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) receives support at the aggregate level but not
at the individual level.
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using the games T and D. We divide the discussion into three parts: issues related to the
perception of the games, the potential for experimenter demand eects, and the logistical
(dis)advantages. In general, we shall argue that any feature of the hybrid design which may
be regarded as a `conceptual drawback' is also present in the between-subjects or/and the
within-subjects design.9
2.3.1. Perception
Wilson (2010, pp. 81) asserts that
\::: if we as the experimenters cannot peer into the minds of our subjects to ascertain
their social motives, then our subjects face the same uncertainty when interacting in the tasks
that we give them. Thus, the problem boils down to one of agreement: Do the subjects agree
on the context of the interaction: Do the subjects agree that this situation invokes the social
motives of a rule of reciprocity, :::, or some other rule to guide behavior?"
By providing the same informational context as used by the researcher the hybrid design
could help in reducing the likelihood of disagreement among the subjects, and between the
experimenter and the subjects, regarding the meanings of the actions available to subjects.
Consequently, one would expect the likelihood of a mismatch between the experimenter's and
subjects' models of the situation to be lower.
If the experimenter believes that the games T and D are appropriate for identifying
reciprocity, then it will be inconsistent to simultaneously believe that the mismatch between
the experimenter's and subjects' models of the interactions will be greater in the hybrid
design compared to the between-subjects design. After all, the choice of the games re
ects
the conviction of the experimenter that they are appropriate for examining the hypotheses.
It is possible that there will be a greater cognitive load on subjects in the hybrid im-
plementation and the within-subjects implementation compared to a between-subjects im-
plementation. However, greater cognitive load in itself may not be a cause for concern if it
ultimately allows the subjects to better understand the experimental task.10
2.3.2. Demand eects
The critical issue facing the hybrid design, or any other design, that reduces the `mismatch'
is that it will be subject to the critique of experimenter demand eects. However, we shall
9In a within subjects implementation, the choice in one game may in
uence the choice in a latter game
(anchoring) and thereby lead to order eects in the decisions of subjects. In the hybrid design, information
about the other game may in
uence the decision of a subject in the game she is actually playing. The current
practice in experimental economics seems to be that the results from a within-subjects implementation are
considered useful only if there is no signicant evidence of anchoring in subjects' decisions. Whenever there
is no such concern for the within-subjects implementation where subjects get to know and play both games,
there should be little cause for concern in the hybrid implementation where subjects would get to know both
games but will play only one of the two games.
10We thank Andreas Ortmann for clarifying the issue pertaining to cognitive load.
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subjects implementation is also subject to a similar critique arising from subjects playing
the games in a sequential manner. The standard counter-argument in the case of within-
subjects implementation is that one can test for the eects of playing the games sequentially
by conducting a dierent experimental session where the games are played in the reverse
order. As discussed below, the hybrid design also allows testing for the eects of information
about the other game in a hybrid implementation.
Suppose we nd a signicant dierence in the behavior of trustees in T and dictators in
D using a hybrid implementation. A possible way to question the validity of such a nding
would be as follows.
1. Subjects in the role of dictators in D may believe that it is the trustees who are supposed
to give relatively more in this experiment.
2. Therefore, the dictators might give less than what they would have given if they did not
have any information about the game T.
Statement [2] implicitly presumes that there is something akin to the `true' dictator be-
havior which would be observed when dictators make their decisions without any information
about the trust game. Apart from its obvious logistical advantage, it does not provide any
conceptual reason to treat the behavior in the isolated dictator game as the appropriate
benchmark.
The critique of demand eects implicitly favors the between-subjects design as the correct
mode of implementing an experiment without a sound conceptual justication. As argued by
Zizzo (2010), demand eects can not be ruled out in the between-subjects implementation. In
fact, the between-subjects design often provides no clue regarding the source, nature, or the
impact of demand eects. It also distracts from the key point that we may not be interested
in the behavior in a game, per se, as the game primarily serves as the tool that allows us to
explore an underlying question. Unless the research question is understanding the behavior
in a particular game, the between-subjects design has no special conceptual signicance.
Nonetheless, whether the information about the other game in
uences the behavior of
subjects in the game they are playing can be easily tested. Consider statement [2]. There
would be two possibilities to consider. First, merely the information about the trust game
might in
uence the behavior of dictators. Second, there might be an additional impact due to
some subjects actually playing the trust game in the same experimental session. The presence
of some subjects playing as trustees might increase the likelihood of dictators thinking as in
[1] compared to the case where subjects are informed about both the games but all subjects
are asked to play the dictator game.
The rst possibility can be tested by comparing the behavior of dictators in a between-
subjects implementation with that of dictators in the variant of the hybrid design described
earlier. The second possibility can be tested by comparing the behavior of dictators in the
hybrid implementation and its variant.
Demand eects create interpretational problems if subjects can come to a specic conclu-
sion regarding the actions that would be in line with the expected objectives of the experi-
menter and act as if to please the experimenter (Zizzo, 2010). The extent to which subjects can
9
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in the hybrid implementation will be no more than in the within-subjects implementation
after subjects receive information about the second game. Moreover, there seems to be little
a priori reason to believe that subjects can come to such a conclusion in all lab experiments
(Lambdin and Shaer, 2009).11
The concern regarding demand eects may be phrased in two other ways. First, it may
be argued that the hybrid design may reveal the research question to the subjects. However,
if the research question gets revealed in the hybrid implementation of an experiment, then it
will eventually get revealed in the within-subjects implementation as well. Even if a design
does reveal the question, it is dicult to accept that revealing `the' question is unambiguously
worse than revealing `some' question given that economic experiments attempt to examine
behavior in the presence of well-dened incentives.
Second, subjects' perceptions may be aected by the possibility that they might believe
that the experimenter sees a dierence between the two games being used in the hybrid im-
plementation even if the subjects themselves do not see any dierence. Once again, there
is hardly anything additional in the within-subjects implementation relative to the hybrid
implementation to stop the subjects from thinking in this manner. Thus, the fact that sub-
jects have information about both the games in the hybrid implementation need not be as
troublesome as it appears.
2.3.3. Logistics
On the positive side, the hybrid design exploits the full force of randomization as subjects are
randomly assigned to the various player-roles during each experimental session which may
help reduce practical concerns regarding dierent types of subjects showing up for dierent
experimental sessions.
Each subject receives exactly the same instructions in the hybrid implementation which
is not the case in a between-subjects implementation. The hybrid implementation (but not
its variant) allows us to credibly elicit incentivized beliefs of a subject about the game she is
playing herself (the within-game beliefs) and about the other game being played by some of
the other subjects (the cross-game beliefs) during the same experimental session.
The hybrid implementation would consume at least as much time per experimental ses-
sion and would provide no improvement in terms of the data collected per session compared
to the between or within subjects designs. It would be dicult to implement if the overall
experiment involves a large number of treatments. However, as hypothesis tests are often
conducted by comparing behavior across two treatments, pairs of treatments that allow a
particular hypothesis to be tested could be implemented in a session.
11Ananish Chaudhuri has provided us the results from an ongoing study wherein subjects are provided a clear
cut `explanation' of the strategic structure of a trust game. One might argue that this alteration introduces
demand eects. However, it is not clear whether this will lead to greater or lower trust and trustworthiness
on part of the trustors and trustees, respectively. Using a between-subjects design he nds greater trust and
trustworthiness in the `explanation' treatment relative to the baseline treatment that was otherwise identical
to the treatment with the explanation.
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We next report the results from the hybrid implementation of the games T and D and
compare the results with the existing literature. Our interest lies in examining the choices
and beliefs of subjects in the hybrid implementation of games T and D to understand,
among other things, whether (and, which) subjects perceive the choice faced by a trustee to
be dierent from the choice faced by a dictator by subjects who actually play only the trust
game or only the dictator game.
3.1. Participants and procedure
We conducted ve sessions each consisting of 32 subjects in the experimental laboratory at
the Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena (Germany). Subjects were students at the
University of Jena. In each session, subjects rst read the instructions on their own and
then the instructions were read aloud by an experimenter. The instructions were framed in
a neutral language and explained both the games to all the subjects. A comprehension quiz
containing questions related to both games was administered to ensure subjects understood
both the games. Subjects were then randomly assigned to one of the four possible roles in
the experiment: trustors and trustees in T and recipients and dictators in D.
The games were played only once. Each session contained eight pairs of subjects playing
T and another eight pairs of subjects playing D. The data consists of observations on a
total of 160 subjects { 40 subjects in each of the four roles. Each subject in the role of a
trustor in T had to choose IN or OUT and each subject in the role of a trustee had to decide
how much to give to the trustor out of twenty monetary units. Every trustee made the choice
without knowing the choice made by the trustor. Casari and Cason (2009) show that trustees
give less to trustors when they do not know the choice made by the trustor. This should
make it dicult for us to nd dierences in the choices of trustees and dictators.
The within and cross game beliefs of subjects were elicited (without prior announcement)
after they made their choices. The belief elicitation was incentivized to limit the possibility
of ex-post rationalization. Note that this concern should be lower for cross-game beliefs.
Subjects were paid three monetary units for an accurate guess, one if their guess deviated (in
absolute value) by one unit, and nothing otherwise. We rst elicited the within-game beliefs
and then the cross-game beliefs for subjects in each role. Table 1 lists the exact sequence of
choices and beliefs for subjects in each role.
Subjects were informed about their payos only after they had made their choices and all
the beliefs had been elicited. Each subject was paid the earnings from the experiment and a
show-up fee of 2.50 monetary units in cash. Each session lasted nearly an hour (including the
instructions and payment) and the average earnings were about fourteen monetary units.
The notation we shall use throughout the paper is as follows. The vector of choices by
subjects in role i will be denoted by Xi. The vector of (rst order) beliefs of subjects in role i
about the behavior of subjects in role j shall be denoted by Fij. The vector of (second order)
beliefs of subjects in role i regarding the belief of a subject in role j about the behavior of a
subject in role k shall be denoted by Sijk. The analysis of data follows.
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Notation Description
A: Trustors
xA 2 fIN;OUTg Choose In or OUT.
fAB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess how much the B in your pair gave to you.
sABA 2 f0;:::;8g Guess the number of A's that chose IN according to the B in your pair.
fAA 2 f0;:::;7g Guess how many of the 7 A's other than you chose IN.
fAD 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen D.
B: Trustees
xB 2 f1;:::;19g How much you want to give to the A in your pair?
fBA 2 f0;:::;8g Guess the number of A's that chose IN.
sBAB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount the A in your pair thinks you gave him.
fBB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen B other than you.
fBD 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen D.
C: Recipients
xC You do not have to make any choice.
fCD 2 f1;:::;19g Guess how much the D in your pair gave to you.
fCA 2 f0;:::;8g Guess the number of A's that chose IN.
fCB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen B.
sCAB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess how much a randomly chosen A thinks the B in his pair gave to him.
D: Dictators
xD 2 f1;:::;19g How much you want to give to the C in your pair?
sDCD 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount the C in your pair thinks you gave him.
fDD 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen D other than you.
fDA 2 f0;:::;8g Guess the number of A's that chose IN.
fDB 2 f1;:::;19g Guess the amount given by a randomly chosen B.
12
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Nineteen out of forty trustors (roughly 50%) chose to trust the trustee in game T by choosing
IN. As depicted in Table 2, fteen of these trustors expected to receive strictly more than the
outside option of ve, two expected to get exactly ve, and the remaining two expected to
receive strictly less than ve. Thus, roughly 90% of the trustors who chose IN expected to
receive an amount (weakly) greater than their outside option. This nding contrasts starkly
with the results of Ashraf et al. (2006) who nd that only 62% of trustors in an investment
game expect to get back (weakly) more from the trustee than what they transferred.
Out of the 21 trustors who chose OUT, twelve expected to receive strictly less than ve,
ve expected to receive exactly ve, and four expected to receive strictly more than ve.
Thus, roughly 80% of the trustors who chose OUT expected to receive an amount (weakly)
lower than their outside option.
Table 2: Choices of Trustors in T
Choice # # (fiB < 5) # (fiB = 5) # (fiB > 5)
IN 19 2 2 15
OUT 21 12 5 4
The distribution of choices of trustees in game T and dictators in game D are summa-
rized in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 2. Exactly 50% of the trustees (20 out of 40) gave
strictly more than the outside option of ve to trustors. The median and mean amounts given
by trustees are greater than the corresponding values for dictators.
Table 3: Choices of Trustees in T and Dictators in D
Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. St. Dev.
XB 1.00 2.00 5.50 5.90 9.00 18.00 4.09
XD 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.55 5.00 15.00 3.42
Our rst hypothesis tests for dierences in the choices of trustees and dictators.
H1: XB = XD
Statistical tests reveal a signicant dierence in the amounts given by trustees and dictators.
The p-values corresponding to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test are
0.029 and 0.007, respectively.
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Figure 2: Choices of Trustees and Dictators
This result suggests that subjects respond more generously when they know that their
action set will be realized from a voluntary choice, rather than an involuntary choice, of
another subject. Though the result is not surprising, it diers from the results obtained by
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) in an almost identical game.12
There are two distinct pieces of information in this result. First, the behavior of dictators
is dierent from that of trustees. Second, trustees give more than dictators on average.
Bolton et al. (1998) and Cox (2004) provide one plausible interpretation of this nding as
described earlier. Following Wilson (2008, 2010) one could also suggest that trustees use the
`rule of reciprocity' and dictators use, say, the `rule of desert' with the former being stronger
than the latter. Our experiment can not distinguish between these two explanations.
McCabe et al. (2003) nd a signicant dierence (using a between-subjects design) in
the choices of trustees and dictators when a trustee decides after observing the choice of the
trustor. They conjecture that Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) do not nd any signicant
dierence in the behavior of trustees and dictators probably because each trustee makes her
decision without knowing the decision of the trustor. The results from the hybrid design
do not seem to support this conjecture. We believe that having information about both the
games allows subjects to associate a meaning to their choices in a way that is not possible in
the between-subjects implementation. This in turn leads to behaviors and beliefs that accord
with our intuitive understanding of reciprocity.
12The payo to the trustee in the trust game used by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) resulting from the
OUT choice by the trustor is zero. We set the corresponding payo at 5 euros. If anything, this should make
a trustee in T
 feel less gratitude towards a trustor who chooses IN compared to a trustee in their trust game.
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The summary statistics regarding the beliefs of subjects in various roles are tabulated in Ap-
pendix I. In this section we wish to examine whether assignment to a particular role in
uences
subjects' beliefs. In order to do so we compare the beliefs of subjects in any two roles about
the choices made by subjects in a particular role.
H2: Fik = Fjk; i;j 2 fA;B;C;Dg; i 6= j; k 2 fA;B;Dg
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Wilcoxon Rank
Sum (WRS) tests. The p-values are greater than 0.1 in 35 out of the 36 cases as reported in
these tables. The only signicant dierence is found in a comparison of the beliefs of trustees
and dictators regarding the choices of trustors using the WRS test (p-value = 0.04). We
shall see in the following sections that these ndings hide the systematic dierences in beliefs
across subjects in the same role who behave dierently.
Table 4: Beliefs about choices of trustors
FAA FAA FAA FBA FBA FCA
p-valuey of vs vs vs vs vs vs
FBA FCA FDA FCA FDA FDA
KS 0.401 0.573 0.573 0.759 0.263 1.000
WRS 0.284 0.636 0.395 0.108 0.040 0.630
y Each trustor was asked to guess how many out of the 7 trustors other than herself (in the experimental
session) chose IN. Subjects in all the other roles were asked to guess how many out of the 8 trustors chose IN.
To carry out the statistical tests the reported beliefs have been `normalized' to lie between 0 and 1.
Table 5: Beliefs about choices of trustees
FAB FAB FAB FBB FBB FCB
p-value of vs vs vs vs vs vs
FBB FCB FDB FCB FDB FDB
KS 1.000 1.000 0.914 0.988 0.759 0.914
WRS 0.977 0.961 0.508 0.992 0.554 0.524
Table 6: Beliefs about choices of dictators
FAD FAD FAD FBD FBD FCD
p-value of vs vs vs vs vs vs
FBD FCD FDD FCD FDD FDD
KS 0.988 0.988 0.401 0.988 0.914 0.988
WRS 0.946 0.632 0.390 0.658 0.559 0.780
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The choice of IN by a trustor in T is qualitatively dierent from the choice of OUT. Similarly,
the choice of giving more than the outside option by a trustee in T may be regarded as
qualitatively dierent from the choice of giving no more than the outside option. Let us
denote the trustors who chose IN as AI's and the trustors who chose OUT as Ao's; and, the
trustees who gave strictly more than the outside option as BH's and those who gave no more
than the outside option as BL's.
We now investigate whether there is any statistical dierence in the within and cross game
beliefs of the two sets of trustors and the two sets of trustees.
H3.1: FAIk = FAok; k 2 fA;B;Dg and SAIBA = SAoBA
H3.2: FBHk = FBLk; k 2 fA;B;Dg and SBHAB = SBLAB
Tables 7 and 8 list the p-values corresponding to the tests of H3. In general, trustors
who chose IN may be termed optimistic relative to the trustors who chose OUT. Compared
to trustors who chose OUT, the trustors who chose IN (i) expect trustees to give relatively
more, (ii) believe that trustees expect a relatively greater number of trustors to choose IN,
(iii) expect a relatively greater number of other trustors will choose IN, and (iv) expect a
randomly chosen dictator to give relatively more. The dierences in beliefs turn out to be
weakly signicant using at least one of the two tests. Similarly, trustees who gave more than
the outside option may be termed optimistic relative to the trustees who gave no more than
the outside option. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the various beliefs of trustors and trustees
conditioned on their choices.
Table 7: Comparing beliefs of AI's and Ao's
FAIB SAIBA FAIA FAID
p-value of vs vs vs vs
FAoB SAoBA FAoA FAoD
KS 0.002 0.091 0.005 0.611
WRS <0.001 0.019 <0.001 0.088
Table 8: Comparing beliefs of BH's and BL's
FBHA SBHAB FBHB FBHD
p value of vs vs vs vs
FBLA SBLAB FBLB FBLD
KS 0.329 0.005 <0.001 0.001
WRS 0.073 0.010 <0.001 <0.001
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Figure 3: Beliefs of trustors conditioned on choice
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Figure 4: Beliefs of trustees conditioned on choice
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ditional or unconditional) other regarding preferences. Heterogeneities across agents are cap-
tured by allowing for dierences in one or more preference parameters and assuming that
the distribution of these parameters is common knowledge among the agents (for example,
Levine 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Sobel, 2005). Other re-
searchers additionally allow for dierences in prior beliefs in the specication of types of agents
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). Systematic dierences in the within and cross game be-
liefs of trustors and trustees who behave dierently provide support for the latter modeling
strategy irrespective of whether or not such a pattern of choices and beliefs is labeled as a
manifestation of the false-consensus eect (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000).
3.6. Beliefs about the choices of dictators and trustees
It has already been reported that the choices of trustees are signicantly dierent from the
choices of dictators. We now examine whether subjects expect a dierence in the choices of
trustees and dictators. Table 9 provides a summary of the beliefs of subjects in each role
regarding the behavior of trustees and dictators. For example, 8 out of the 40 trustors expect
a randomly chosen dictator to give strictly more than the trustee they are paired with, 17
trustors expect both to give equal amounts, and the remaining 15 trustors expect the trustee
to give more. The average of the dierence between the individual level beliefs of trustors
regarding the choices of trustees and dictators is 0.75. Apart from the trustors who chose out
(Ao's) the number of subjects in any given role who expect trustees to give relatively more is
greater than the number of subjects who expect dictators to give relatively more. Figure 5
illustrates the beliefs of subjects across all the roles regarding the choice made by a randomly
chosen trustee and a randomly chosen dictator.
Table 9: Beliefs about choices of trustees and dictators
A AI Ao B BH BL C D Total
Observations 40 19 21 40 20 20 40 40 160
#(fiB < fiD) 8 2 6 9 4 5 6 9 32
#(fiB = fiD) 17 6 11 13 5 8 15 13 58
#(fiB > fiD) 15 11 4 18 11 7 19 18 70
fiB   fiD 0.75 1.84 -0.24 0.90 1.25 0.55 0.925 0.65 0.81
We rst pool the data on subjects in all the four roles and test the following hypothesis
using the (paired) Wilcoxon Signed Rank test.
H5: FallB = FallD
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The p-value corresponding to the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test is less than 0.001 and thus
the above hypothesis is strongly rejected. We next examine whether this result is primarily
driven by subjects in a particular role or do subjects in each role expect a dierence in the
choices of trustees and dictators.
H6: FkB = FkD; k 2 fA;Ao;AI;B;BL;BH;C;Dg
The p-values corresponding to Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests under the above hypotheses
are reported in Table 10. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected for recipients and dictators.
It is also weakly rejected for trustors. After dividing the trustors according to their choice we
nd that AI's expect a signicant dierence in the choices of trustees and dictators whereas
Ao's do not. A roughly similar qualitative pattern is observed in the case of trustees. Although
we fail to reject the null hypothesis for trustees as a whole, this result seems to be primarily
driven by those trustees who gave no more than the outside option (BL's). They do not
expect a signicant dierence in the choices of trustees and dictators but BH's do expect a
(weakly) signicant dierence.
Table 10: Tests of H6
FAB FAoB FAIB FBB FBLB FBHB FCB FDB
p-value of vs vs vs vs vs vs vs vs
FAD FAoD FAID FBD FBLD FBHD FCD FDD
WSR 0.059 0.606 0.006 0.159 0.842 0.089 0.011 0.040
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a dictator because the former involves reciprocation but the latter does not. However, such a
subject may not be condent that other subjects will share this view or that even if subjects
share this view they may not act in accordance with this view. Among subjects in the roles
of trustors and trustees it is only those who behave in a pro-social manner (AI's and BH's)
that expect a dierence in the choices of trustees and dictators. It might be reasonable to
conclude that AI's and BH's, the recipients, and the dictators
1. perceive the nature of the choice faced by trustees to be dierent from that faced by
dictators;
2. believe that other subjects in the roles of trustees and dictators will also perceive this
dierence; and,
3. are condent that the choices of trustees and dictators will re
ect this dierence.
The lack of dierence in the beliefs of Ao's and BL's regarding the choices of trustees and
dictators re
ects, at the least, the failure of (3). Given that the remaining subjects seem to
perceive a dierence in the choices faced by trustees and dictators we suspect that this does
not imply a failure of (1) for Ao's and BL's. It may not be unreasonable to suggest that
subjects across all the roles perceive a dierence between the choice faced by the trustees and
the choice faced by the dictators. The hybrid design allows us to interpret this dierence to
be driven by the lack of any element of reciprocation in the choice faced by a dictator.
4. Discussion
The interpretation of data from lab experiments may be dicult if there is a mismatch between
the experimenter's and subjects' models of the interactions. The between-subjects implemen-
tation is probably the unwritten norm for most classes of experiments in economics (Camerer,
2003, pp. 41). The within-subjects implementation prioritizes reducing dierences in behav-
ior across dierent games that could arise in the between-subjects implementation because of
dierent subjects playing the dierent games. The hybrid implementation prioritizes reduc-
ing the mismatch in perceptions of the same game that could arise in the between-subjects
implementation because of the abstract nature of a game.13
In contrast with the results obtained by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) using a between-
subjects design, the results we obtain using the hybrid implementation of trust and dictator
games reveal a signicant dierence in the behavior of trustees and dictators.14 It seems that
information about the trust game provides a reference for dictators and information about
the dictator game provides a reference for trustees, something which is not possible in the
between-subjects implementation. This interpretation is further supported by the pattern in
the beliefs of subjects. A signicant majority of subjects perceive the nature of the choice
13The data obtained from a hybrid implementation of any given experiment may or may not dier from a
standard implementation (within or between). Of course, it is possible in some cases that the interpretation
could dier even if the data obtained from a hybrid implementation are identical to the data obtained from,
say, the between-subjects implementation.
14Needless to remark, dierences in subject pools may partly contribute to these dierences in the data.
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their choices without knowing the choice of the trustor (which diers from the conjecture by
McCabe et al., 2003). Given the results of Cason and Casari (2009), we would expect that
our results would be further strengthened if trustees made their choice after observing the
choice of the trustors.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have focused on one of the various dimensions of the complex issue of context
as it relates to the conduct of lab experiments and the interpretation of the resulting data:
how to increase the likelihood that subjects attach the same meanings to actions as does the
experimenter. The importance of context in studies of social preferences is succinctly ex-
pressed by Wilson (2010, pp. 81) when he states that \by their sociality people are trained in
conventions to apply, and not necessarily deliberately so, dierent rules of behavior depending
upon the contextual cues of the interaction." The hybrid design proposed in the paper may
serve as a useful complement to the between and within subjects designs, especially in studies
of social preferences. After all, it is the experience with `sociality' upon which the experi-
menter relies while designing an experiment related to social preferences. The hybrid design
implicitly exploits this feature and attempts to provide the informational setting where sub-
jects can use their experiences with the same `sociality' to arrive at the meanings for actions
that the experimenter believes in.
The hybrid design diers from the notions of `framing' and `priming' in a fundamental
manner. After identifying the treatments to test the relevant hypotheses, the experimenter
can frame the experiment or prime the subjects in several ways. In contrast, there will exist
only one way to conduct the hybrid implementation of the experiment. The hybrid design
may be thought of as a step towards nding the appropriate middle ground between the polar
views of presenting experimental instructions in abstract terms or framing them with details
of a particular context in order to enhance interpretability of results without compromising
much with their generality.
We conclude by noting that the discussion in the present paper would be vacuous if there
existed designs and ways to deliver the instructions that help subjects to perfectly understand
the abstract treatment condition where they make their decision. In other words, subjects do
not necessarily need to interpret the choices available to them in light of alternative treatments
that they could participate in. The ultimate objective is to reduce the mismatch between
subjects' and experimenter's models of any interaction and all ways of achieving this need to
be explored.
References
[] Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., and Piankov, N. (2206). \Decomposing Trust and Trustworthiness."
Experimental Economics, 9, pp.193-208.
[] Bardsley, N. (2008). \Dictator Game Giving: Altruism or Artefact?" Experimental Eco-
nomics, 11, pp. 122-133.
21
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 090[] Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moatt, P., Starmer, C. and Sugden, R. (2010).
Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. Princeton University Press.
[] Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K. (1995). \Trust, Reciprocity and Social History."
Games and Economic Behavior, 10, pp. 122-42.
[] Birnbaum, M. H. (1999). \How to Show that 9 > 221: Collect Judgments in a Between-
subjects Design." Psychological Methods, 4, pp. 243-249.
[] Blanco, M., Engelmann, D., and Norman, H. T. (2008). \A Within-Subject Analysis of
Other-Regarding Preferences." Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming.
[] Bohnet, I., Fiona, G., Benedikt, H., and Zeckhauser, R. (2008). \Betrayal Aversion." Amer-
ican Economic Review 98(1), 2008, pp. 294-310.
[] Bolton, G. E., Brandts, J., and Ockenfels, A. (1998). \Measuring Motivations for the Re-
ciprocal Responses Observed in a Simple Dilemma Game." Experimental Economics, 1(3),
pp. 207-219.
[] Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. (2000). \ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Com-
petition." American Economic Review, 90(1), pp. 166-193.
[] Bolton, G. E. (2010). \Testing Models and Internalizing Context." Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 73, pp. 16-20.
[] Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2003.
[] Casari, M. and Cason, T. N. (2009). \The Strategy Method Lowers Measured Trustworthy
Behavior." Economics Letters, 103, pp. 157-159.
[] Cherry, T. D., Frykblom, P., and Shogren, J. F. (2002). \Hardnose the Dictator." American
Economic Review, 92(4), pp. 1218-1221.
[] Cox, J. C. (2004). \How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity." Games and Economic Behav-
ior, 46, pp. 260-281.
Modeling Economic Behavior." Experimental Economics, 11, pp. 1-24.
[] Cox, J. C. (2010). \Some Issues of Methods, Theories, and Experimental Designs." Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 73, pp. 24-28.
[] Dana, J., Cain, D. M., and Dawes, R. M. (2006). \What You Don't Know Won't Hurt
Me." Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 100(2), pp. 193-206.
[] Dufwenberg, M. and Gneezy, U. (2000). \Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet
Game." Games and Economic Behavior, 30(2), pp. 163-182.
[] Dyer, D. and Kagel, J. H. (1996). \Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commer-
cial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse." Management Science, 42(10),
pp. 1463-1475.
[] Eckel, C. C. and Wilson, R. K. (2004). \Is Trust a Risky Decision?" Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 55(4), pp. 447-465.
[] Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. (2008). \Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of In-
centive Theory." American Economic Review, 98(3), pp. 990-1008.
[] Engelmann, D. and Strobel, M. (2000). \The False Consensus Eect Disappears if Repre-
sentative Information and Incentives Are Given." Experimental Economics, 3, pp. 241-260.
[] Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). \A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Coopera-
tion." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), pp. 817-868.
22
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 090[] Harrison, G. W. and List, J. A. (2004). \Field Experiments." Journal of Economic Litera-
ture, 42(4), pp. 1009-1055.
[] Homan, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V. L. (1996). \Social Distance and Other-regarding
Behavior in Dictator Games." American Economic Review, 86(3), 653-659.
[] Kahneman, D. (2003). \Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Eco-
nomics." American Economic Review, 93(5), pp. 1449-1475.
[] Lambdin, C. and Shaer, V. A. (2009). \Are within-subjects designs transparent?" Judg-
ment and Decision Making, 4(7), pp. 554-566.
[] Levine, D. K. (1998). \Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments." Review of
Economic Dynamics, 1(3), pp. 593-622.
[] Levitt, S. D. and List, J. A. (2007). \What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social
Preferences Reveal About the Real World?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21(2), pp.
153-174.
[] Levitt, S. D., List, J. A, and Reiley, D. H. (2010). \What Happens in the Field Stays in
the Field." Econometrica, 78(4), pp. 1413-1434.
[] List, J. A. (2007). \On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games." Journal of Political
Economy, 115(3), pp. 482-493.
[] McCabe, K., Rigdon, M. L., and Smith, V. L. (2003). \Positive Reciprocity and Intentions
in Trust Games." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 52(2), pp. 267-275.
[] Orne, M. T. (1962). \On the Social Psychology of the Psychological Experiment: With
Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and their Implications." American Psychol-
ogist, 17(11), pp. 776-783.
[] Orne, M. T. (1973). \Communication by the Total Experimental Situation." Communica-
tion and Aect. Second Edition. Eds. P. Pliner, L. Krames and T. Alloway. Academic Press.
[] Ortmann, A. and Gigerenzer, G. (1997). \Reasoning in Economics and Psychology: Why
Social Context Matters." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153(4), pp.
700-710.
[] Samuelson, L. (2005). \Economic Theory and Experimental Economics." Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 43(1), pp. 65-107.
[] Smith, V. L. (2003). \Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics." American
Economic Review, 93(3), pp. 465-508.
[] Smith, V. L. (2010). \Theory and Experiment: What are the Questions?" Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, 73, pp. 3-15.
[] Sobel, J. (2005). \Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity." Journal of Economic Lit-
erature, Vol. 43(2), pp. 392-436.
[] Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1981). \The framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice." Science, 211, pp. 453-458.
[] Wilson, B. J. (2008). \Language Games of Reciprocity." Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization, 68, pp. 365-377.
[] Wilson, B. J. (2010). \Social Preferences aren't Preferences." Journal of Economic Behav-
ior and Organization, 73, pp. 77-82.
[] Zizzo, D. J. (2010). \Experimenter Demand Eects in Economic Experiments." Experi-
mental Economics, 13(1), pp. 75-98.
23
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 090Appendix I: Beliefs
Table 11 provides a summary of the beliefs of trustors in the trust game and recipients in the
dictator game. Table 12 separately summarizes the beliefs of trustors who chose IN and those
who chose OUT. Table 13 provides a summary of the beliefs of trustees in the trust game and
dictators in the dictator game. Table 14 separately summarizes the beliefs of trustees who
gave strictly more than the outside option to trustors and those who did not.
Table 11: Beliefs of trustors and recipients
Trustors in Game T Recipients in Game D
FAB SABA FAA FAD FCD FCA FCB SCAB
Median 5.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
Mean 5.65 4.20 3.48 4.90 4.65 3.73 5.58 5.68
Std. Dev. 3.53 2.21 2.17 3.25 3.56 2.10 3.19 3.39
Table 12: Beliefs of trustors conditioned on choice
Trustors who chose IN Trustors who chose OUT
FAIB SAIBA FAIA FAID FAoB SAoBA FAoA FAoD
Median 9.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 5.00
Mean 7.74 5.05 4.74 5.90 3.76 3.43 2.33 4.00
Std. Dev. 3.30 1.54 1.63 3.43 2.59 2.46 1.98 2.86
Table 13: Beliefs of trustees and dictators
Trustees in T Dictators in D
FBA SBAB FBB FBD SDCD FDD FDA FDB
Median 4.50 8.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 5.00
Mean 4.50 7.42 5.72 4.83 5.42 4.50 3.50 5.15
Std. Dev. 2.11 3.73 3.68 3.19 3.59 3.62 2.12 3.11
Table 14: Beliefs of trustees conditional on choice
Trustees who gave more than 5 Trustees who gave at most 5
FBHA SBHAB FBHB FBHD FBLA SBLAB FBLB FBLD
Median 5.00 10.0 8.00 8.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Mean 5.15 8.80 8.00 6.75 3.85 6.05 3.45 2.90
Std. Dev. 1.76 2.07 3.03 2.99 2.28 4.50 2.78 2.02
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